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Even ADR Must Pay Its Dues: An 
Analysis of the Evolution of the 
Internal Revenue Service’s ADR 
Programs and Where They Still Need 
to Grow 
 Stephen Folan1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
It has been said that “[t]oday, there can be little doubt that ‘alternative’ 
dispute resolution is anything but alternative.”2  Courts, agencies, and even 
corporations are regularly utilizing a diverse range of alternative dispute 
resolution procedures such as mediation, arbitration, and negotiation.3  Yet 
one organization where alternative dispute resolution does not seem to be 
fully embraced is the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”).  The IRS Appeals 
Office was created in 1927 to act as an independent entity for taxpayers to 
settle their disputes outside of the IRS—although it is still subject to the 
Service’s jurisdictionand it was designed as an option where taxpayers 
could contest their claims in a fair and impartial forum.4  However, although 
the stated goals of the Appeals Office are to resolve tax controversies 
without litigation and to be fair and impartial to both parties, the IRS has had 
significant difficulty implementing alternative dispute resolution.5  In fact, 
one former tax court judge and mediator stated that “[p]ost-appeal mediation 
 
 1. Stephen Folan received his Juris Doctor from Pepperdine University School of Law in 
2013.  He was an Executive Editor for the Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal and served 
as Treasurer of the Labor and Employment Law Association. 
 2. Nancy A. Welsh, Integrating “Alternative” Dispute Resolution into Bankruptcy: As 
Simple (and Pure) as Motherhood and Apple Pie?, 11 NEV. L.J. 397, 397 (2011). 
 3. Id. 
 4. Gregory P. Mathews, Using Negotiation, Mediation, and Arbitration to Resolve IRS-
Taxpayer Disputes, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 709, 713 (2004). 
 5. Christopher Wagner et al., How to Handle a Tax Controversy at the IRS and in Court, 
ST009 ALI-ABA 89, 93 (2011). 
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at the IRS is broken.”6  Although this declaration may be extreme, it is true 
that, under the appeals process, both mediation and arbitration suffer mutual 
problems that prevent the IRS from being effectively utilizing them  to 
resolve taxpayer disputes.7 
Among other reasons, disputes arise when taxpayers disagree with an 
IRS finding, refuse to file a tax return, or fail to comply with the IRS’s 
request for more information.8  However, while the purpose of the IRS 
Appeals Office is to resolve and settle disputes at the earliest opportunity, 
the issues holding back mediation and arbitration limit them to acting as 
narrowly focused alternatives with few of the advantages of commercial 
alternative dispute resolution.9 
The main cause for these issues is speculated to be a lack of trust 
between both parties, which creates no incentive for taxpayers to actually 
treat mediation or arbitration as viable alternatives to resolving their dispute 
in the first place.10  Under the present alternative dispute resolution systems, 
it appears difficult to actually establish that necessary trust between the IRS 
and taxpayers.  It appears that trust cannot be established because the post-
appeal process focuses on protecting the IRS rather than on creating a 
neutral and independent environment with incentives for both parties to 
resolve their disagreement.11 
This article analyzes the IRS’s post-appeal mediation and arbitration 
systems, and advocates for its adoption of contemporary commercial 
arbitration principles to make its program desirable  for both the IRS and 
taxpayers.  Part II will discuss the history and evolution of alternative 
dispute resolution in the IRS’s appeals system.  Part III will look at the 
present state of the IRS’s dispute resolution processes.  Part IV will consider 
the underlying problems with the available dispute resolution processes.  
Part V will recognize defenses in favor of the present systems.  Part VI will 
analyze three possible reforms and will advocate their adoption by the IRS, 
 
 6. Carolyn Miller Parr, Why Postappeal Mediation Isn’t Working and How to Fix It, 
TAX.COM (Sept. 16, 2009), http://www.tax.com/taxcom/features.nsf/Articles/11704085C68E8F7885
2576330002C150.  Although IRS mediators attempt to be genuinely neutral and professional, the 
problems with the post-appeal programs lie with the structure of the programs themselves.  Id. 
 7. See id. 
 8. Mathews, supra note 4, at 709. 
 9. Id. at 709–10.  Rather than extensively utilizing mediation and arbitration, the Appeals 
Office relies on negotiations with an appeals officer, which results in questionable outcomes when 
the taxpayer’s claim is too small to warrant an extensive defense or too large to bridge the gap 
between the parties’ desires.  Id. at 710–11. 
 10. See Parr, supra note 6. 
 11. See id.  While it is true that IRS mediators and arbitrators strive to be genuinely impartial 
and professional in performing their duties, the appearance of partiality still seems to prevent the 
establishment of trust between both sides in the appeal process.  Id. 
2
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with the goal of making its dispute resolution processes more cost-effective 
and desirable for both parties.  Part VII will anticipate the potential impact 
of these reforms on the IRS.  Finally, Part VIII will restate the current IRS 
appeals process and advocate its reform before briefly concluding. 
II. HISTORY OF THE APPEALS MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION SYSTEMS 
The Appeals Office of the IRS was first established in 1927 and regards 
itself as one of the earliest dispute resolution organizations in the United 
States.12  The Appeals Office was founded with the purpose of settling 
disputes with taxpayers and avoiding litigation.13  As a result, unlike the IRS 
Examination Division, which only analyzed black letter law and applied it to 
taxpayers, the Appeals Office was empowered with the authority to consider 
broader issues, such as the administrative costs and expenses of following 
through with litigation or continued appeals.14  Although the primary method 
used during the appeals process was negotiating settlements through IRS 
officials, if those negotiations proved unsuccessful, the taxpayer had the 
option to elect either mediation or arbitration.15  Mediation and arbitration 
were initially quite limited in scope and applicability, but both are well 
established parts of the IRS history of appeals. 
While negotiation was traditionally the preferred method of resolving 
disputes at the IRS, the Appeals Office began to expand its mediation and 
arbitration programs following the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act 
(“ADRA”), which Congress passed in 1990.16  The ADRA mandated that 
government agencies establish and implement alternative dispute resolution 
methods in their administrative dispute resolution processes.17  As a result of 
 
 12. David Parsly, The Internal Revenue Service and Alternative Dispute Resolution: Moving 
From Infancy to Legitimacy, 8 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 677, 678 (2007). 
 13. Id. at 678–79.  The Appeals Office is seen as an efficient alternative to costly litigation in 
the federal district courts or in the U.S. Tax Court that allows both parties to avoid litigation 
expenses.  Amy S. Wei, Can Mediation Be the Answer to Taxpayers’ Woes?: An Examination of the 
Internal Revenue Service’s Mediation Program, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 549, 551 (2000). 
 14. Parsly, supra note 12, at 679. 
 15. Id.  However, these programs were not significantly expanded by the Appeals Office 
because the negotiation process was generally regarded by the IRS as sufficient for settling taxpayer 
disputes.  See Wei, supra note 13, at 551.  Because of this, a taxpayer is still only able to elect 
alternative dispute resolution once settlement has failed under the normal negotiation procedures.  
Id. at 552. 
 16. Parsly, supra note 12, at 679. 
 17. Mathews, supra note 4, at 715. 
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the congressional mandate, the IRS expanded and created more formal 
procedures for arbitration and mediation of taxpayer disputes.18 
The IRS’s first step was to further integrate mediation in 1995 by 
making it available both during the appeals program and during litigation in 
tax court.19  In 2000, the IRS implemented the second step by introducing 
arbitration during the post-appeal process.20  However, the scope of the 
arbitration is highly limited and is designed only to resolve factual issues 
relevant to the taxpayers’ disputes.21  In addition, at any time during the 
appeals process or during the available alternative dispute resolution 
procedures, the taxpayer remains free to pursue traditional litigation 
instead.22 
III. OVERVIEW OF THE CURRENT APPEALS SYSTEMS 
Although alternative dispute resolution programs are available both 
prior to and following the appeals program, it is prudent to start at the 
beginning because the pre-appeal programs are considerably more utilized 
than the post-appeal programs.23  Generally when an audit of a taxpayer’s 
tax return leads to a disputed amount in his taxable income, the taxpayer is 
issued a letter informing him that he has thirty days in which to file a request 
for appeals to reconsider the adjustment.24  However, prior to receiving the 
thirty-day letter, the taxpayer may elect to engage in mediation with the IRS 
 
 18. See id. at 716.  As part of the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, the IRS began to 
implement more formalized alternative dispute resolution procedures in order to supplement the 
negotiations process and to improve its image and service to taxpayers.  Id. at 715–16. 
 19. Parsly, supra note 12, at 679.  The role of mediation has consistently increased since the 
program was instituted.  Id.  However, the program has not met significant success, most likely due 
to the unequal positions between the two parties under the current system.  See Peyton H. Robinson, 
Alternative Dispute Resolution Procedures with IRS Appeals, 23 UTAH B.J. 18, 21–22 (March/April 
2010). 
 20. Parsly, supra note 12, at 679–80.  Although post-appeal arbitration was only introduced as 
a trial program, the program was modified and extended past its trial period in 2002 and is still 
offered to taxpayers.  Id. 
 21. Robinson, supra note 19, at 22.  This program is significantly different from commercial 
arbitration because it lacks many of the rules and procedures that commercial arbitration uses to 
enforce independence.  Id.  Furthermore, it is also distinct from international treaties between the 
IRS and other countries, which mandate that the arbitrator must choose between the best positions 
offered by both parties.  Id.  Without assurances of independence or other incentives, taxpayers have 
had relatively little reason to elect the program. 
 22. See Parsly, supra note 12, at 680. 
 23. See id. at 711. 
 24. See Robinson, supra note 19, at 18.  If the taxpayers fail to file the request for appeals, 
then a second letter advises them that they have ninety days to file a petition with the tax court 
before collection begins.  Id.  The original letter is generally the taxpayer’s only window for 
reconsidering the proposed adjustment prior to litigation.  Id. 
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under either the Fast Track Mediation (FTM) or Fast Track Settlement (FTS) 
programs.25 
Under the FTM program, the taxpayer can choose to mediate disputed 
issues with the IRS by calling in an appeals officer empowered to act as a 
“neutral third party” to the dispute.26  FTM is generally available as an 
optional program, that may be elected by the taxpayer, but the process may 
be terminated at will by either party.27  One advantage of FTM is that it does 
not replace other dispute resolution options, and should mediation prove 
unsuccessful, the taxpayer may still choose to continue through the appeals 
process once the mediation is over and the thirty-day letter is issued.28  
Because the appeals officer is not empowered to consider the hazards of 
litigation in mediating the factual dispute, the FTM program is generally 
thought to be advantageous where the law is clear and only the facts are in 
dispute, because it allows the parties to come to a quick and expedient 
understanding before the issue goes on to appeals or litigation.29 
While the goal of the FTM program is to mediate the dispute prior to 
receiving a thirty-day letter, the purpose of the FTS program is to resolve 
and settle the case within 120 days by arriving at a mediated settlement.30  
One of the primary distinctions between FTM mediation and FTS mediation 
is that, under the FTS program, the appeals officer acting as a mediator is 
empowered to consider the hazards of litigation as part of his or her 
settlement authority.31  Much like under the IRS’s other mediation programs, 
if the FTS mediation is unsuccessful, the taxpayer does not waive any 
administrative rights and may continue with the normal appeals process.32  
The ideal role for the FTS program is seen not as a method for the taxpayer 
 
 25. Id. at 18. 
 26. Id.  While successful enough to warrant extension past its initial pilot period, this program 
is available only to the Small Businesses/Self-Employed division of the IRS.  Parsly, supra note 12, 
at 695. 
 27. Robinson, supra note 19, at 18–19. 
 28. Id. at 19. 
 29. See id. 
 30. Id. at 19–20.  Similar to the limitations under the FTM program, the taxpayer is generally 
only eligible to elect FTS before the IRS issues a thirty-day letter.  Id. at 20. 
 31. Parsly, supra note 12, at 692.  However, if the settlement is based on the hazards of 
litigation, an appeals closing agreement is necessary and subject to approval from management.  
Robinson, supra note 19, at 20.  A further distinction is that while FTM is available to small 
businesses and to self-employed taxpayers, FTS is limited to large and mid-sized businesses.  See id. 
at 18–20. 
 32. Robinson, supra note 19, at 20. 
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to avoid adjustment, but instead as an outlet for the parties to reach an 
agreement on how much will be paid in a quicker and more efficient 
manner.33 
Because not all taxpayers agree upon a settlement during the appeals 
process, a taxpayer still has the option to participate in post-appeal 
mediation or arbitration.34  However, these programs are significantly less 
utilized and are considered more controversial because of perceived 
inequality between the two parties.35  The IRS updated its post-appeals 
mediation program, which was formally established in 2002, in 2009 by 
issuing Revenue Procedure 2009-44, which expanded and clarified the types 
of cases that were applicable for post-appeals mediation.36  As a general rule, 
post-appeal mediation is available only in situations where appeals 
settlement negotiations have occurred and there are still remaining issues to 
mediate.37  Furthermore, in order to be applicable for post-appeal mediation, 
all other issues must already be resolved except for the issues being 
mediated.38 
The final option is post-appeal arbitration of tax disputes.  This program 
is meant to be utilized when negotiations have dragged on unsuccessfully for 
a significant amount of time and the taxpayer believes that the dispute has 
legitimate merit.39  In such a situation, post-appeal arbitration is available for 
the limited purpose of resolving only the factual issues relevant to the 
dispute.40  The program is optional and may be elected by either the taxpayer 
or the Appeals Office, subject to consultation with the other party.41  Both 
parties must enter a written agreement to arbitrate that (1) specifies the issue 
that the parties agreed to have arbitrated, (2) assigns the arbitrator the task of 
finding facts, (3) precisely describes the answer that the parties seek, (4) 
describes and limits the information the arbitrator may consider, (5) contains 
an initial list of participants from each party, (6) provides a mutually agreed 
time and place of hearings, and (7) prohibits ex parte contacts between the 
 
 33. Id. at 20. 
 34. Id. at 21. 
 35. See supra notes 5–11 and accompanying text. 
 36. Rev. Proc. 2009-44, 2009-40 I.R.B. 462. 
 37. See id. 
 38. See id.  The Revenue Procedure specifically excludes from eligibility issues that are 
designated for litigation, deemed inappropriate under statutory or administrative guidelines, and 
considered frivolous or otherwise inequitable.  Id. 
 39. See Robinson, supra note 19, at 22. 
 40. See id.  However, in some situations, post-appeal arbitration may also be available after 
the taxpayer engages in unsuccessful post-appeal mediation.  Id.  In order to transfer the mediation 
into arbitration, the relevant factual issues must be the determinative reason that the mediation 
failed.  Id. 
 41. Rev. Proc. 2006-44, 2006-2 C.B. 800. 
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arbitrator and the parties.42  The parties must mutually agree to select an 
arbitrator either from the appeals office or from a local or national 
arbitration organization.43 
IV. CRITICISMS OF THE CURRENT APPEALS SYSTEMS 
Critics of the IRS’s alternative dispute resolution systems typically 
focus on the fact that the Appeals Office has been reluctant to fully embrace 
and implement mediation and arbitration as effective alternatives to its 
established negotiation procedures.44  For example, although the use of pre-
appeal mediation by the IRS and taxpayers is steadily increasing, to the point 
of being called an “unmitigated success,” its integration into the appeals 
process has been narrowly limited in scope and expanded only gradually 
with each test program.45  One issue with the FTM program is that the 
taxpayer cannot have an outside party conduct the mediation: the mediator 
must be an IRS employee.46  Because of this restriction, one of the most 
enduring and problematic concerns with FTM is the perceived lack of 
impartiality.47  Critics of the FTM program rightly suggest that the success 
of any mediation depends on open communication and trust between the 
participants.48  Without a mediator that both parties recognize and trust to be 
impartial, the parties cannot be confident enough to fully disclose 
information and take the mediator’s evaluations at face value.49 
 
 42. Id.  Examples of precise answers include a specific monetary value, a range of acceptable 
monetary values, and a clearly affirmative or negative finding by the court.  Id. 
 43. Id.  In the event an outside arbitrator is selected, the parties must share the costs.  
Robinson, supra note 19, at 22.  This includes not only compensation for the arbitrator, but all 
expenses, related fees, and reasonable costs.  Rev. Proc. 2006-44, 2006-2 C.B. 800.  On the other 
hand, if an appeals officer is selected, the Appeals Office will pay all expenses associated with the 
arbitrator, effectively making it more likely to be the default position for a taxpayer.  Id. 
 44. See Wei, supra note 13, at 551.  As evidence of this, although the IRS is required under the 
ADRA to engage in alternative dispute resolution, in most cases it is available only after negotiations 
have been attempted and failed.  Id. at 552–53. 
 45. Id. at 559–60.  One member of Congress went so far as to recognize that not only should 
the IRS put mediation to greater use, but also that taxpayers should be encouraged to believe that it 
is “the right thing to do.”  Id. at 560. 
 46. See Mathews, supra note 4, at 730. 
 47. See id. at 729–31. 
 48. Id. at 717–18. 
 49. Id. at 718.  Although appeals officers are specially trained and tend to behave with genuine 
neutrality, the fact that they are still IRS employees paid by the agency makes it difficult for 
taxpayers to actually believe they will be impartial mediators.  See Parr, supra note 6. 
7
Folan: Even ADR Must Pay Its Dues: An Analysis of the Evolution of the I
Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2013
 288 
In addition to sharing many of the same inherent issues as FTM, the 
IRS’s current FTS procedure has a number of additional flaws that 
discourage taxpayers from believing that its election is to their benefit.  One 
of the chief drawbacks is the lack of restrictions against ex parte 
communications between appeals officers.50  As a result, if FTS is elected 
and results in a failure to settle, there are no limitations in place to prohibit 
subsequent appeals officers who work on the case from discussing anything 
that came up in the settlement discussions.51  There are no limitations 
stopping the taxpayer from returning to the appeals process after 
unsuccessful mediation.  Yet because all information resulting from that 
mediation is available upon returning to appeals, this seems to indicate that 
there is very little reason under the current system for a taxpayer to elect the 
option in the first place. 
Post-appeal mediation suffers from substantially similar problems as 
pre-appeal mediation, but in many cases these issues only become more 
pronounced after the appeals process.52  Because the default position of the 
IRS is to use its own specially trained appeals officers as mediators, it is 
difficult to convince taxpayers that the officer can truly be an unbiased party 
in the discussion.53  This means that the taxpayer is unable to speak candidly 
with the mediator, even if the mediator is a specially trained professional 
who truly does attempt to act in a fair and unbiased manner.54  Mediation is a 
second chance for a taxpayer to convince a neutral third party that he or she 
has a valid argument against the IRS, but it is difficult for any taxpayer to 
believe that an IRS employee will be more swayed by his or her argument 
than by his or her employer’s argument.55 
While the mediation programs have definite room for improvement, 
post-appeal arbitration is in the worst position of the IRS’s various dispute 
resolution options.  Critics of the program recognize that, under the current 
process, there is very little incentive for taxpayers to elect post-appeal 
 
 50. See Robinson, supra note 19, at 20.  This is explicitly stated in IRS revenue procedures, 
which clearly indicate a lack of restrictions upon intra-appeals communications.  Id. 
 51. See id. 
 52. See supra notes 34–35, 46–57 and accompanying text. 
 53. See Parr, supra note 6.  Even though it is possible for the taxpayer to bring in an outside 
mediator, he or she must bear the costs, which makes it an unprofitable and highly discouraging 
option for a taxpayer who is trying to save the money he denies is owed to the IRS.  Id. 
 54. See id. 
 55. Mathews, supra note 4, at 728.  Mediation also represents a chance for the taxpayer to 
discover holes in his argument in advance of litigation, convincing him to settle beforehand.  Id.  
However, he clearly may be concerned that an IRS mediator’s perspective could be biased.  See id. 
at 729–30. 
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arbitration—and it is frequently not even attempted.56  Similar to the 
mediation programs’ method of selecting mediators, both IRS and non-IRS 
officials may be chosen as arbitrators.57  Yet if the arbitrator is a non-IRS 
official, then the parties must share costs, which means that an IRS appeals 
officer is likely to be the arbitrator by default.58  The problem with this is 
that, unlike commercial arbitration, there are no assurances of arbitrator 
independence.59  In fact, the Appeals Office is even allowed to bring in other 
appeals officers or IRS chief counsel attorneys to participate in the 
arbitration, creating even more doubt for the taxpayer that the process will 
be independent and confidential.60  Additionally, should the taxpayer 
actually attempt to elect post-appeal arbitration, the program is completely 
optional and must be agreed upon by both sides, so there is no guarantee that 
the IRS will agree to arbitrate in the first place.61  Should the IRS refuse, 
there is no system in place to appeal the refusal, providing even less 
incentive for the taxpayer to make the attempt.62 
V. DEFENSE OF THE CURRENT APPEALS SYSTEMS 
Advocates of the present ADR programs at the Appeals Office typically 
emphasize the position shared by the IRS itself: that the primary focus of the 
Appeals Office is negotiation rather than mediation or arbitration.63  As a 
result, its programs are designed with a purposely narrow scope and 
application so that they can supplement, rather than replace, the existing 
negotiation process.64  Further, there are concerns that non-IRS mediators 
 
 56. See Stephen Joyce, Officials Urge Taxpayers to Use Alternative Dispute Resolution Tools, 
105 DAILY TAX REPORT G-3 (June 1, 2007).  The IRS acknowledged that although the program was 
instituted in 2000, only fourteen taxpayers had actually requested post-appeal arbitration as of 2007.  
Id.  Furthermore, of those fourteen, only one taxpayer’s case had actually been resolved as a result.  
Id. 
 57. See Parsly, supra note 12, at 711–12. 
 58. See id. at 711–12. 
 59. Robinson, supra note 19, at 22. 
 60. Id. at 22. 
 61. See Parsly, supra note 12, at 711. 
 62. Id.  A taxpayer may request a conference in order to discuss the denial with the Appeals 
Office, but there are no regulations or standards under which the office is required to reconsider.  Id. 
 63. See Mathews, supra note 4, at 714.  This belief is partially justified by the high rate of 
success the IRS has with negotiations, but understates the value that mediation and arbitration offer 
as equally valid alternatives.  See Wei, supra note 13, at 551–52. 
 64. Mathews, supra note 4, at 716. 
9
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would be unfamiliar with tax law and that the lack of expertise would offset 
the value of their mediation experience.65 
The argument in favor of the present FTM procedure emphasizes that 
the program is a promising development that will slowly expand as the IRS 
works towards improving its efficiency and fairness.66  While recognizing 
that the IRS has significant room for improvement in its mediation protocol, 
defenders of the program see it not as a final product, but as a good 
foundation, noting that in 2002 the program was made a permanent and 
more accessible part of the appeals process.67  The success of its limited trial 
programs is an encouraging sign that the IRS will further expand mediation 
as a viable alternative, but this can only happen once the IRS overcomes its 
reluctance to expand from its existing negotiations programs.68 
Furthermore, promoters of the FTS program recognize that, although it 
may be ineffective in assisting taxpayers to actually avoid a judgment, it is at 
least moderately successful as a way of coming to a quickly expedited 
agreement with the IRS.69  While average audit cases take almost two years 
to move through the appeals process, successful FTS cases resolve in 
considerably less time, saving both parties time and money regardless of the 
amount the case settles for.70  The FTS program routinely settles cases even 
faster than its stated goal of resolving cases in 120 days, indicating that the 
program is both quick and efficient despite its procedural shortcomings.71 
The program proved sufficiently successful by the IRS’s standards, such 
that it was expanded to small businesses and to tax exempt or governmental 
entities in 2008.72  However, while it is clear that FTS is a moderate success 
in spite of its procedural shortcomings, the program can become an even 
greater success by addressing its problems and by becoming be more 
procedurally efficient.  Therefore, it is important to do this early on, before 
 
 65. Wei, supra note 13, at 567.  However, some state agencies have had success with outside 
mediators by placing strict requirements such as classroom training, a minimum number of 
observations or co-mediations with experienced IRS mediators, and a degree from an accredited 
college.  Id.  In order to even qualify for mediation of a topic outside of their expertise, more 
extensive training is further required.  Id.  This seems to greatly reduce the concern that only appeals 
officers are qualified to mediate tax issues. 
 66. Mathews, supra note 4, at 728. 
 67. Id. at 720.  Specifically, eligibility requirements for access to the program were 
significantly reduced, with an amount in controversy requirement being completely abolished.  Id. 
 68. See id. at 721. 
 69. See Robinson, supra note 19, at 20. 
 70. Id. at 21.  IRS officials note that FTS cases typically resolve in an average of only seventy-
nine days, compared to typical results of over 600 days for complex audit cases subjected to 
negotiations.  Id. 
 71. See id. at 20. 
 72. Id. at 21. 
10
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subsequent programs pattern themselves on the same approach, so that the 
steps taken by the IRS to expand its mediation system are as effective as 
possible. 
Although recognizing that the IRS’s post-appeal arbitration program is 
flawed when compared to both negotiation and mediation, defenders of the 
IRS’s arbitration program believe that it still offers significant advantages 
over litigation.73  Namely, it provides an average taxpayer with a setting in 
which to present his case that is more relaxed, but still formal and 
structured.74  The program is emphasized as a “last resort” after negotiations 
and mediation have failed to settle the dispute.75  Under this interpretation, 
the fact that it is rarely elected may be an intentional outcome, because the 
goal of the Appeals Office is to resolve cases before they ever reach the 
point where arbitration becomes necessary.76 
VI. A CASE FOR POSSIBLE REFORMS OF THE APPEALS SYSTEMS 
The first possible reform of the current Appeals Office’s alternative 
dispute resolution process is to mandate mediation.  This is one of the first 
places where reform of the dispute resolution procedure should begin, as 
mediation’s benefits are such that it should be placed as early in the appeals 
process as possible.  Mediation is recognized as particularly well-suited to 
tax disputes because it allows for flexible outcomes and greatly decreases 
transaction costs if successful; this means that even settling for an amount 
less than the full amount in controversy is more profitable than receiving the 
full amount after costly litigation.77  In addition, it is clear that there is both 
political and public support for mediation as a viable method of resolving 
tax disputes, making it an excellent time to consider mediation as an 
alternative option rather than merely a secondary approach to negotiation.78 
 
 73. Mathews, supra note 4, at 731–32. 
 74. See Parsly, supra note 12, at 713–14. 
 75. Id. at 714. 
 76. Id.  Because post-appeal arbitration is rarely ever elected, this is taken as validating this 
belief in practice.  Id.  However, it is unclear whether the rare usage of the program is a result of 
intentional design or is an unexpected consequence of the program’s lack of incentives for taxpayers 
to elect it in the first place.  See supra notes 56–62 and accompanying text. 
 77. Leonora Meyercord, Avoiding State Bankruptcy: Mediation as an Alternative to Resolving 
State Tax Disputes, 29 REV. LITIG. 925, 931 (2010). 
 78. See id. at 934–35.  The ADRA is a clear indication that the trend in Congress is to further 
encourage ADR procedures.  See Parsly, supra note 12, at 679.  This is reinforced by the IRS’s 
tentative but promising attempts to expand and formalize its mediation programs.  Id. 
11
Folan: Even ADR Must Pay Its Dues: An Analysis of the Evolution of the I
Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2013
 292 
With more and more agencies and courts adopting mediation as a 
regular facet of their dispute resolution procedures, there is little reason for it 
to be merely a second choice at the IRS, and requiring it at the outset as a 
precursor to negotiations could lead to a beneficial result much earlier in the 
appeals process.79  In many state courts, mediation as a form of dispute 
resolution is not only strongly encouraged, but is often a required pre-
litigation consideration by the parties.80  This is true even though the parties 
in such cases do not necessarily have to settle or accept the outcome of their 
mediation.81  In some approaches, initial participation in the mediation 
process is a condition precedent to even advancing onward to litigation at 
all.82 
Because mediation remains essentially voluntary, both the courts’ 
interest in efficient, less expensive resolutions and the power of parties to 
resolve their disputes in the manner they see fit are still respected and 
advanced.83  Putting mediation at the forefront of the appeals process and 
requiring the parties to at least attempt mediation benefit both the IRS and 
the taxpayer sooner, by giving them an option to attempt resolving their 
dispute before continuing on to the appeals process, rather than leaving them 
to go through the negotiation process first.84 
A second suggested reform of the Appeals Office’s alternative dispute 
resolution procedures is making it more independent.  Although all evidence 
indicates that appeals officers are professionals who strive to remain 
independent and impartial—despite being on the IRS payroll—the Appeals 
Office has been rightfully criticized for fostering at least the appearance of 
partiality.85  Though not always a rational or even realistic belief, it is easy to 
understand why a taxpayer might believe that an IRS agent acting as a 
 
 79. Welsh, supra note 2, at 397. 
 80. Jacqueline Nolan-Haley, Mediation Exceptionality, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1247, 1247 
(2009).  See also 28 U.S.C. § 652(a) (2006) (requiring litigants to at least consider the use of 
alternative dispute resolution processes and permitting district courts to require their use in 
appropriate cases). 
 81. Nolan-Haley, supra note 80, at 1254.  This approach has also been explicitly allowed by 
Congress for labor disputes, where the Railway Labor Act codified mediation as the primary method 
of resolving disputes and required initial attendance of both parties at mediations.  Wei, supra note 
11, at 565–66. 
 82. Nolan-Haley, supra note 80, at 1253. 
 83. Dr. iur. Ulrich Boettger, Efficiency Versus Party EmpowermentAgainst a Good-Faith 
Requirement in Mandatory Mediation, 23 REV. LITIG. 1, 10–11 (2004). 
 84. Although the IRS is experimenting with early mediation through the FTM and FTS 
programs, the problem is that entry into both programs remains optional and is easily terminated.  
See id. at 5–7.  Rather than requiring the parties to at least consider mediation at the outset, using 
these programs is completely optional, which means many cases that could benefit from early 
mediation do not.  See Robinson, supra note 19, at 19–20. 
 85. Parr, supra note 6. 
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mediator is inherently biased in favor of his or her employer.  Yet under the 
present system, it is unfortunately often difficult for taxpayers to justify 
bringing in an independent mediator because the default position of the IRS 
is to use their own appeals officers.86  In order to convince taxpayers that 
mediation is in their best interest, it is necessary to take steps to convince 
them that their mediator will act as an impartial third party rather than as an 
IRS agent. 
For example, one solution proposed by scholars is the creation of a new 
unit, tentatively titled the “ADR Center,” which would be distinct from the 
Appeals Office with its own staff acting as mediators and arbitrators.87  This 
would bring the IRS closer in line to the dispute resolution programs 
available under other federal agencies, which provide for outside third party 
mediators rather than agency employees.88  Furthermore, this would also 
bring IRS dispute resolution more in line with commercial dispute resolution 
procedure, which emphasizes not only the reality but also the perception of 
impartiality as being equally necessary for dispute resolution to be 
effective.89  It is vital for the IRS to take steps to both provide impartiality 
and to convince taxpayers that it exists—and this simply cannot be 
accomplished by continuing to utilize in-house employees on the payroll of 
only one party in the dispute. 
The third reform for the Appeals Office’s alternative dispute resolution 
programs is updating the arbitration process to better match the standards of 
commercial arbitration.  Although arbitration reform may be seen as less 
urgent than mediation reform due to its placement at the end of the appeals 
process—when both parties have already established their positions before 
trial—it is still worth developing because it is a highly preferable alternative 
 
 86. See Wei, supra note 13, at 567.  This is particularly true of post-appeals mediation 
because, in order to bring in an outside mediator, the taxpayer must bear the mediator’s full fee and 
expenses rather than split the costs between both parties.  Parr, supra note 6.  Additionally, even if 
the outside mediator is brought in, he is required to co-mediate with an IRS mediator under 
circumstances in which each party only trusts “its” mediator to be on its side.  Id. 
 87. John Klotsche, Jousting with the Tax Man: ADR at the IRS, Part II, TAX.COM (Sept. 14, 
2009), http://www.tax.com/taxcom/features.nsf/Articles/BF3113A27C566E3D8525762E0060948D.  
The proposal recognizes that taxpayers are unlikely to see IRS appeals offices as independent third 
parties, despite the officers’ training as such.  Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id.  However, it would be difficult for the Appeals Office to achieve genuine independence 
with its current staff and structure.  Id.  Thus, the concept of a separate ADR Center working 
together with the Appeals Office is ideal because it would provide experienced mediators who are 
well-versed with the tax process, but without having to put appeals employees in the middle of 
disputes between Appeals and the taxpayer.  Id. 
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to litigation should the other processes fail.90  Even if a majority of cases 
settle before that point, a well-established and efficient arbitration program 
may mean the difference between settling the remainder of cases that reach 
that point or going onward to the expense of litigation. 
The Appeals Office’s current arbitration procedure has little in common 
with modern arbitration methods either in commercial settings or even in 
other IRS arbitration programs.  In commercial arbitration, arbitrators must 
be impartial and satisfy strict standards in order to ensure both sides are 
satisfied that the arbitrator is a neutral party.91  In fact, this strictly enforced 
independence is typically one of the primary motivations that compel parties 
in commercial settings to use arbitration in the first place: because the 
opposing sides are more willing to settle their dispute in arbitration because 
they believe the forum is a neutral setting where they each have a fair chance 
of obtaining what they want.92  In order to compel the parties to make a good 
faith effort to work out their dispute, commercial arbitrators commonly 
employ “last offer arbitration”—otherwise known as “baseball 
arbitration”—to lead both parties towards a mutually acceptable settlement 
amount.93  This technique requires each party to state its best offer for the 
award amount.  The arbitrator is empowered only to select one offer or the 
other.94  As a result, it is in the best interest of both parties to determine what 
they honestly believe to be a reasonable offer; if one side is too extreme, 
then that side runs the risk of the other party’s number being chosen 
instead.95  Though not perfectly applicable to tax disputes, this demonstrates 
the flexibility that arbitration can still bring to the appeals process.  It would 
make an excellent starting point for the IRS in considering alternative 
methods, which settle otherwise irreconcilable disputes before the parties 
run the risk of taking the last step towards even more time consuming and 
expensive litigation. 
Another important principle of commercial arbitration that the Appeals 
Office should consider adopting is an emphasis on the impartiality of 
arbitrators.  In international commercial arbitration, the procedures 
specifically mandate that any potential arbitrator act impartially according to 
a list of recognized standards and rules of practice.96  There are no similar 
 
 90. MARGARET L. MOSES, THE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION 4 (2008). 
 91. See Klotsche, supra note 87. 
 92. See MOSES, supra note 90, at 3. 
 93. Id. at 15. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. International Dispute Resolution Procedures, AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION 
(June 1, 2010), http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=33994. 
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assurances under IRS procedures that an appeals arbitrator’s independence is 
ensured by such specific guidelines, and in the absence of any serious 
restrictions on the partiality of an appeals arbitrator, taxpayers seemingly are 
not convinced that the program is in their best interests.97  By taking similar 
steps to commercial arbitration procedures, to assure taxpayers that they 
truly are being heard by a neutral arbitrator, the Appeals Office may be able 
to foster the taxpayer confidence necessary for arbitration to be a successful, 
viable dispute resolution alternative and encourage disputants to pursue it 
when appeals reach that point. 
However, it is noteworthy that not only is appeals arbitration different 
from what is successfully practiced in commercial settings, but the system is 
also markedly different from the methods otherwise utilized by the IRS.  
This is because its arbitration is an optional choice at the end of the appeals 
process, rather than mandatory like in other IRS programs.98  For example, 
under its international income tax treaties with other countries, mandatory 
arbitration is allowed for the specific purpose of supplementing the 
negotiation process.99  In order to carry out mandatory arbitration, the IRS 
partnered with the International Center for Dispute Resolution (ICDR), a 
non-profit public service organization which agreed to provide 
administrative services.100  Rather than using IRS employees as arbitrators, 
through their partnership agreement, the ICDR is able to independently 
select potential arbitrators with relevant tax and arbitration experience.101  
The Appeals Office may well be able to benefit from a similar partnership in 
order to provide mandatory arbitration at the end of the appeals process, 
further reducing the amount of tax disputes that actually go all the way to 
trial. 
While mediation is the first and foremost topic of reform that the 
Appeals Office should look at, it is clear that there are also numerous ways 
that its arbitration program can be refined and modernized by examining 
 
 97. See supra notes 59–62 and accompanying text (suggesting that without assurances of 
independent and impartial arbitrators that there is little incentive for taxpayers to attempt arbitration). 
 98. Compare I.R.S. Announcement 2011-4 I.R.B. 433 (limiting arbitration and mediation to an 
optional election that may be requested only after consulting with the other party and getting them to 
concur), with Mandatory Tax Treaty Arbitration, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE (Dec. 10, 2008), 
http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/International-Businesses/Mandatory-Tax-Treaty-Arbitration 
(requiring mandatory arbitration as a supplement to the standard negotiation process). 
 99. See Mandatory Tax Treaty Arbitration, supra note 98. 
 100. Id.  Services rendered include training, selection of neutral arbitrators, case management, 
and institutional experience and expertise in the field.  Id. 
 101. Id. 
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how successful arbitration programs are run elsewhere.  By reforming the 
process for post-appeal arbitration to better resemble these more successful 
commercial and international arbitration institutions, arbitration may be 
converted from an inferior “last resort” to a more viable alternative or 
effective safety net should mediation and negotiation fail. 
VII. THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF IMPLEMENTING MEDIATION AND 
ARBITRATION REFORMS IN THE IRS APPEALS PROCESS 
It is important to stress that this article does not propose that the IRS 
should elevate alternative dispute resolution procedures to a higher status 
than the existing negotiation process, but instead suggests that the appeals 
office should integrate mediation and arbitration in ways that complement 
the negotiations procedure.  Dispute resolution processes should serve as 
“bookends” that potentially settle disputes either before or after they go 
through the negotiation process.102  The success of the existing negotiation 
process cannot be questioned, but the IRS can further improve the process 
through better use of mediation and arbitration.103  There are several possible 
benefits that both the IRS and taxpayers may expect from these reforms. 
The first impact from mediation and arbitration reforms—perhaps even 
the primary impact—would be offering a significant financial benefit to both 
the IRS and taxpayers.  Integrating alternative dispute resolution into the 
appeals process would allow the IRS to manage its costs and allocate its 
resources more effectively, allowing the Service to not only settle more 
disputes without reaching litigation, but also to more efficiently prepare for 
the smaller number of cases which are not settled by the appeals office.104  
This increased flexibility would also benefit taxpayers by providing them 
with a faster and more reliable way to equitably settle their disputes in 
comparison to litigation, which is recognized as “costly, time-consuming, 
unpredictable, and . . . a last-resort remedial option.”105  Finally, a less 
 
 102. See supra notes 77–79 and accompanying text (noting that mediation is particularly well-
suited to settling tax disputes and should be equal in status to negotiations as a viable alternative 
dispute resolution option). 
 103. See supra notes 15, 63 and accompanying text (recognizing that the IRS relies on 
negotiations as its primary focus due to its high rate of success but arguing that arbitration and 
mediation are capable of equivalent levels of success). 
 104. See, e.g., John Klotsche, Jousting with the Tax Man, Part 1, Section III.A., TAX.COM 
(Sept. 14, 2009), http://www.tax.com/taxcom/features.nsf/Articles/C844618C8C5792968525762E00
63E693.  Recognized benefits to the IRS include the ability to reduce the total cost and labor 
currently devoted to conflicts rather than to negotiation, as well as the option to craft more flexible 
results and terms than are possible under the current system.  Id. 
 105. Id. 
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obvious benefit to the IRS is that, by improving the mediation and 
arbitration procedures utilized by the Appeals Office, the agency will also 
create a more “resolution-focused atmosphere” where the quality of each 
settlement reached would improve with experience.106  Such an atmosphere 
could lead to more cases being settled through arbitration and mediation, 
resulting in greater financial benefit for the IRS as more cases are settled 
quickly for amounts that are satisfactory to both parties.107 
In addition, a second promising outcome of alternative dispute 
resolution reform is that it could significantly bolster the IRS’s public 
relations efforts, while improving the Appeals Office’s legitimacy in the 
eyes of taxpayers.  The IRS has a vested interest in improving its public 
relations because improving the way taxpayers look at the tax system has a 
direct relationship in how willingly they submit both to taxation itself and to 
participation in dispute resolution related to taxation.108  Increased 
willingness to engage in open dispute resolution with a neutral third party 
acting as the arbitrator or mediator, rather than an IRS employee whose 
interests are seen as closer to the Service than to the taxpayer, would greatly 
improve the outlook that the taxpayer takes away from the experience.109  
However, the potential benefits from such an improvement would extend 
beyond merely improving the Service’s reputation.  In order to have a 
successful taxation system, it is vital for the IRS to have “an effective 
grievance handling system” for dealing with unsatisfied taxpayers when 
conflicts arise.110  Developing the idea that the IRS is open to settlement 
through arbitration and mediation is in the Service’s best interest: a system 
that taxpayers trust to ensure a fair and equitable outcome results in 
increased confidence that resolution will be possible outside of court.111  The 
Appeals Office already enjoys a high success rate, thanks to its well-
 
 106. Mathews, supra note 4, at 734–35.  This atmosphere would be the result of most disputes 
going through the various ADR processes, creating a perception that almost all disputes could be 
settled without litigation.  Id. 
 107. See id. at 735. 
 108. See Wei, supra note 13, at 549. 
 109. See supra notes 46–49 and accompanying text (stating that mediators in the current 
appeals mediation programs typically must be IRS employees, and that this system prevents the 
taxpayer from believing that the mediator is a truly neutral third party). 
 110. Wei, supra note 13, at 549.  The IRS National Director of Appeals has gone as far as 
suggesting that improved alternative dispute resolution is essential to creating an effective system 
that handles grievances and promotes voluntary participation by taxpayers.  Id. at 549–50. 
 111. Mathews, supra note 4, at 736. 
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established negotiations process,112 but providing more well-rounded 
procedures to cater to taxpayer needs can only further improve its public 
image.  Further bolstering the image of the Appeals Office as a legitimate 
outlet for dispute resolution where settlement is not only possible, but almost 
a certainty—even if negotiations fall through—could have the direct result 
of convincing more taxpayers that it is in their best interest to comply with 
the appeals process and to consistently avoid the expense of possible 
litigation.113 
As a result of improving the public’s perception of the Appeals Office, 
the third outcome is creating greater incentive for taxpayers to participate in 
the appeals process in the first place.  One of the biggest issues that scholars 
recognize with the current mediation and arbitration programs is a lack of 
taxpayer participation.114  However, this reluctance is unsurprising, because 
under the current system there is relatively little reason for taxpayers to 
believe that submitting to arbitration or mediation is in their best interests.115  
The current mediation system offered by the Appeals Office is regarded as 
“designed solely to protect the IRS from wily taxpayers” and does little to 
encourage trust on the part of the taxpayer who must submit to it.116  This 
runs contrary to one of the main advantages of both arbitration and 
mediation, which is the ability for the parties to settle their dispute in a 
neutral forum where neither side believes the other has a “home court 
advantage.”117  In fact, this promise of a neutral forum has been recognized 
as one of the primary reasons that commercial arbitration is so desirable: it 
encourages disputants to take part in a settlement process where they are 
confident that they will receive a fair hearing and an equitable outcome.118 
While the accomplishments of the Appeals Office and its negotiation 
procedures are an impressive testament to the IRS’s history of resolving 
disputes without litigation, the success of appeals in one approach should not 
prevent Appeals from exploring other avenues that may be promising as 
 
 112. See supra notes 9, 63 and accompanying text (suggesting that the success of the appeals 
office’s traditional negotiations approach led to reluctance in applying arbitration and mediation 
programs as serious alternatives). 
 113. See Mathews, supra note 4, at 736–37.  This outcome is especially probable because 
favorably resolved mediations have already been recognized as demonstratively improving the 
outlook of participants and reducing the odds of subsequent conflicts.  See Klotsche, supra note 87.  
This is true for both commercial and federal entities, which extensively utilize ADR.  Id. 
 114. Parsly, supra note 12, at 707.  Taxpayers’ reluctance to participate was seen as 
“perplexing” because, in light of the daunting number of cases pending in the appeals system each 
year, the actual number of cases submitted for mediation was comparatively insignificant.  Id. 
 115. See supra notes 9–11 and accompanying text. 
 116. Parr, supra note 6. 
 117. MOSES, supra note 89, at 1. 
 118. Id. at 1–3. 
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equal and valid alternatives to negotiation.  Reforming its arbitration and 
mediation programs has the potential to greatly improve the image and 
reputation of the IRS Appeals Office, while also securing considerable 
financial benefits to both the Service and to taxpayers.  Based on the success 
of mediation and arbitration in commercial contexts, as well as the success 
of the Service’s limited experiments with mediation, it is reasonable to 
believe that the two programs will flourish if given the chance.  They should 
be vigorously pursued by the Appeals Office going forward. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Since its founding over eighty-four years ago, the IRS Appeals Office 
has been one of the nation’s earliest dispute resolution entities, and it offers 
a successful alternative to costly litigation through its well-established 
negotiations procedures.  Despite having proven that alternative dispute 
resolution of tax disputes can be efficient and fair to both parties, the 
Appeals Office has been understandably reluctant to expand its already 
successful program to encompass arbitration and mediation as well, out of 
concern that it may take away from the success they have had with 
negotiations.  However, while the present negotiations procedure is a viable 
and enduring institution, there is ample incentive for the IRS to embrace 
both mediation and arbitration as alternatives to the traditional negotiations 
process. 
Both the IRS and taxpayers would greatly benefit from increased 
availability of refined mediation and arbitration programs, which save both 
parties more time and money when utilized together than negotiations do 
alone.  By taking steps to convince taxpayers that their mediators and 
arbitrators are independent, neutral third parties who will reliably help them 
reach fair outcomes, the appeals process as a whole benefits by leading to 
shorter appeals processes, more settlements, and reduced costs to all parties 
while still achieving an equitable result. 
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